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This study investigates whether the variation in the expected costs of technical default leads 
managers to manipulate earnings in periods prior to, as well as in, the year in which avoidance of 
technical default becomes unlikely. We argue that managers have private information about the 
expected costs and consequences of default and, prior to default, condition their decisions about 
accounting choice and discretion on these expectations. We provide evidence on the endogeneity 
of two forms of discretion in accounting choices in the context of testing the debt covenant 
hypothesis. We document that both forms of earnings management are associated with a lower 
cost of technical default. Our findings also suggest earnings management is less likely when the 
expected cost of technical default is low, and such decisions are associated with a lower default 
cost for firms that actually enter technical default.  
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debt, technical default, positive accounting 
 







The Effect of Technical Default Cost1 on Discretionary Accounting Decisions 
I. Introduction 
Contracting theory views corporations as institutions engaged in mobilizing resources to 
create wealth and benefits for their stakeholders. In other words, corporations grow in size and 
complexity partly because of their ability to mobilize productive resources and create wealth. 
Contracting theory further suggests that firms are governed by efficient technologies that include 
a connected series of contracts (e.g., employment, compensation, and debt). However, firms are 
also governed by efficient technologies like the monitoring activities of internal and external 
auditors, debt holders, government regulators, the board of directors, audit committees, and 
compensation committees. Such stakeholders use accounting numbers in most aspects of these 
contracting and monitoring technologies, such as determining compensation, testing debt 
covenants, and monitoring managerial performance. Whereas flexibility in Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) requires the use of managerial discretion, a large body of 
research suggests that in some instances this discretion results in accounting earnings that are 
biased toward a specific result (see Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a review of this literature). 
In this study we investigate not only the degree to which corporate managers employ 
specific, allowed discretion in generating accounting earnings but also their reasons for doing so. 
We explore the first issue in the context of debt contract monitoring; i.e., in terms of the financial 
covenants in lending agreements that constitute efficient contracting technologies for controlling 
the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Smith 
and Warner (1979)).2 We address the second issue by investigating the relative levels of one 
                                                 
1 If borrowers neglect to make timely debt service payments, they are in actual default of their debt contracts. 
However, if borrowers are compliant with debt service payments but have violated some other debt covenant, they 
are in what is commonly (and here) referred to as technical default.   
2 Recent contributions to the financial contracting literature emphasize the important role of debt contracting in 




incentive, the cost of technical default, and its association with the use of discretion in reporting 
accounting earnings.  
We use disclosures found in the notes accompanying a firm’s financial statements and 
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) to identify 221 firms in technical default from 
1994 to 2000. We then use that data and principal component analysis to calculate the cost of 
technical default. Because lenders are primarily concerned with the downside region of a 
borrower’s earnings distribution, we investigate whether discretionary managerial accounting 
decisions to increase earnings are related to the expected costs of technical default in periods 
prior to and the period of the technical default by means of a system of three structural equations 
using a two-stage least squares procedure.   
We find that managers use both discretion in accounting method changes and accounting 
accruals to make income-increasing accounting choices surrounding covenant violations that 
lead to technical default. One motivation for such actions is evident from the reported results: 
both types of discretionary accounting decisions to manage earnings upward lead to lower 
technical default costs in the periods surrounding covenant violations. We also find that our 
incentive variable, the expected cost of technical default, is positively associated with income-
increasing choices in both accounting methods and accounting accruals. Lastly, our findings 
suggest that managers view discretionary accounting choices to manage earnings upward using 
accounting methods and accounting accruals as substitutes. Specifically, we document a negative 
relation between the two forms of earnings management, which suggests managers use discretion 
in the choice of accounting methods to increase income. In turn, such decisions tend to be 
associated with a reduction in the use of accounting discretion in income-increasing accruals and 
vice versa. These findings are consistent with the covenant-based hypothesis in the periods 




Warner (1979) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) that the strength of incentives to use 
accounting discretion depends on the costs of violating debt covenants. Thus, we interpret our 
findings as being consistent with the assumption implicit in the covenant-based hypothesis that 
income-increasing incentives are greater for firms experiencing higher technical default costs 
surrounding periods of covenant violations.  
We contribute to the financial contracting literature in two ways. First, by investigating 
whether managerial discretionary decisions on income-increasing accounting choices are 
associated with variations in the expected cost of technical default. Specifically, we address 
whether failure to control for the strength of the incentives, generated by these costs, to make 
income-increasing accounting choices is a plausible explanation for the inconsistencies in the 
literature in periods prior to and of covenant violations. Second, by investigating whether the 
strength of one incentive to act opportunistically affects discretion in both accounting method 
changes and accounting accruals, failure to incorporate both forms of discretionary accounting 
choices could also help explain inconsistencies in prior research. However, unlike prior 
covenant-based literature, which typically investigates both forms of discretion as independent 
managerial choices to avoid covenant violations, our research design considers the endogenous 
nature of managerial expectations about default costs. That is, we expect managers to consider 
the costs and benefits of changing accounting methods to manage earnings upward while 
simultaneously considering the costs and benefits of income-increasing accrual management in 
response to an increase in the expected probability of technical default. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the motivation of 
this study and summarizes relevant prior literature. Section III discusses our data and variable 
measurement, and Section IV outlines our research design and model specifications. Section V 




II. Motivation and Prior Literature 
a. Motivation 
By investigating one incentive for avoidance of covenant violations—the expected costs 
of technical default—this paper aims to determine whether these costs are associated with 
managerial accounting choices. Such technical default costs can include, but are not limited to, 
reduced borrowing limits, increased collateral requirements, increased restrictive covenants, 
increased interest rates, and in the extreme, demands for immediate payment of all outstanding 
balances.  
The empirical evidence on the covenant-based hypothesis for periods prior to technical 
default is mixed. For instance, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Demerjian (2009), and Sweeney 
(1994) find that, consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis, managers of firms in technical 
default make income-increasing accounting changes in the periods before the violation. Franz et 
al. (2014) find that post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), firms with stronger incentives to avoid violating 
debt covenants had a smaller reduction in earnings management than firms with weaker 
incentives; also consistent with the debt covenant literature. However, Healy and Palepu (1990) 
and DeAngelo et al. (1994) find no support for the hypothesis. Similarly, Sweeney (1994), in an 
investigation of income-increasing accounting method changes, extends the covenant-based 
hypothesis to the fiscal period of default and finds evidence consistent with such extension to the 
fiscal period of covenant violation. However, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), using income-
increasing accounting accruals that are arguably a less costly form of manipulation, find 
inconsistent results for the fiscal year of covenant violation.  
b. The Effect of Technical Default Cost on Earnings Management Decisions 
Debt contracting technologies in private lending agreements appear to have evolved 




that the customization of private (versus public) lending agreements leads to differences in 
contracting costs. For example, lower renegotiation costs in private lending agreements, relative 
to public lending agreements, generally result in more restrictive debt covenants (Smith and 
Warner (1979); Leftwich (1983)). In response to such tighter debt covenants, the covenant-based 
hypothesis posits that managers have incentives to make accounting method and accrual 
decisions that reduce the likelihood of the financial covenants in their firms’ debt agreements 
being violated. Smith and Warner (1979) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) argue that the 
strength of these incentives depends on the costs of violating debt covenants.3 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) compare two recalculated financial covenants to reported 
covenant levels obtained from the DealScan database and find technical violations, not 
necessarily associated with financial distress, in approximately 30 percent of their sample. Based 
on their results, they conclude that private lenders use debt covenants as trip wires for borrowers. 
Thus, the Dichev and Skinner (2002) findings offer support for the debt covenant hypothesis but 
shed little light on either the process by which managers use discretion in accounting or the types 
of incentives that affect discretionary accounting decisions. Naturally extending the Dichev and 
Skinner (2002) findings raises the following question: Why do only some, but not all, corporate 
managers affect accounting earnings and thus report earnings just above their covenant 
thresholds? Two plausible reasons are (1) variations in accounting choice slack, and (2) 
variations in the cost of making accounting choices that manage earnings upward. 
c. Cost of Technical Default 
                                                 
3 The conditions that constitute default are listed in the loan agreement and frequently include failure to pay sums 
due on principal and interest; failure to comply with specified provisions of the loan agreement; breach of warranty 
or representation; and, often, a cross-default clause. This cross-default clause, the principal clause in loan 
agreements, examines all covenants and gives the lender the right to terminate the agreement and accelerate the loan 




As Beneish and Press (1993) show, technical default is costly. The default costs reported 
in the financial contracting literature include increased interest rates, tightened restrictions in 
existing covenants, additional restrictive covenants, reduced capital expenditure, and reduced 
availability of future lending (Beneish and Press (1993, 1995); Chen and Wei (1993); Sweeney 
(1994); Nini et al. (2007); Sudheer and Roberts (2008); Amir (2009)). This study sample 
includes only firms that do not enter bankruptcy, therefore, the only costs we expect managers to 
avoid are refinancing and restructuring costs. Beneish and Press (1993) document the former at 
between 1% and 2% of a firm’s market value of equity. They also suggest any additional 
financing and investing covenants imposed following technical default indicate increased 
monitoring.  
 Sweeney (1994) finds the costs of technical default vary across firms, ranging from so 
relatively small as to be insignificant to quite material with regard to the debt contract. The 
lowest cost of technical default occurs when a firm receives a permanent waiver with no 
renegotiation, implying no change in the terms of the loan. Dichev and Skinner (2002) argue for 
a further result of technical violation with effectively zero cost; namely, that only violations not 
“cured” need be reported. Thus, when a firm enters technical default and obtains a waiver prior 
to the release of financial statements, the default does not become public knowledge. On the 
other hand, the highest cost results when a firm’s debt contracts include cross-default provisions, 
which state that if any loan defaults, all other loans are also in default, and all lenders accelerate 
their loans by requiring immediate and full payment. As shown in Dichev and Skinner (2002), 
this latter result is so rare as to be almost not a consideration. The calling in of loans is reserved 
for the most seriously distressed firms, therefore, firms that have either defaulted on their debt 




Because lenders are primarily concerned with the downside region of a borrower’s 
earnings distribution, we investigate whether discretionary managerial accounting decisions to 
increase earnings are related to the expected costs of default in periods prior to and the year of 
technical default. Admittedly, our sample selection method requires an ex-post financial 
covenant violation in a private lending agreement that could produce a selection bias toward 
firms whose managers perceive covenant violations as inevitable or toward firms without 
sufficient accounting choice slack to upwardly manage earnings. However, in either case, the 
sample selection process biases against rejection of the null hypothesis of income-increasing 
accounting choices in the years prior to and in the year of the covenant violation. 
We argue that managers have private information about the expected costs and 
consequences of technical default and, prior to default, condition their accounting choices on 
these expectations. That is, we assume managers can, on average, reliably predict the outcome of 
technical default and, thus, accurately measure its cost. This assumption is plausible in that 
managers not only have past experience with most of their lenders but informal discussions with 
their lenders as they approach technical default. Additionally, managers have asymmetric 
information about their firm’s financial position that is a significant factor in determining 
technical default costs.  
III. Data and Variable Measurement 
a. Primary Sample Selection Procedures 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation S-X requires disclosure of the 
circumstances surrounding any breach of a debt covenant existing on the balance sheet date in 
the notes accompanying a firm’s financial statements.4 As a result, corporate managers must 
                                                 
4 Rule 4-08 of Regulation S–X of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission rules (17 CFR §210.4–08; 
i.e., Rule 4-08, General Notes to Financial Statements). Additionally, pronouncements of the accounting profession 




disclose in a note to financial statements whether or not the lender has asserted any rights 
resulting from the technical default. Even though the lender can waive rights for a stated period 
of time, disclosures called for by Regulation S-X must still be made. The SEC also mandates 
further discussion of events having a potential impact on a firm’s financial condition in cases 
where a brief description in the notes accompanying the financial statements may be insufficient 
for investors to fully understand the event.5 This management discussion and analysis (MD&A) 
offers another potential source of information about technical default on credit agreements.  
To identify firms in technical default, we search three databases—LexisNexis, the Dow 
Jones News Service, and Compact Disclosure—that disclose public companies’ annual reports 
for the fiscal years 1994 to 2000. Our purpose in using three sources is to extract as 
comprehensive a sample as possible of first-time violators of accounting-based debt covenants. 
As a data source for technical default and its costs for our sample, we use the notes 
accompanying financial statements and the MD&A disclosed in annual and (when available) 
quarterly reports. As in prior studies (Beneish and Press (1993); Chen and Wei (1993); DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994)), we search for keywords likely to identify technical default such as 
“default,” “violation,” and “waiver”. We stopped hand collecting data as of 2000 out of concerns 
that the 9/11 attacks and the economic events during the following years, such as the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, the housing crisis, and the recession, would cause banks to be more risk 
averse. We assumed these events would lead banks to modify their behavior through tighter 
covenants, stricter negotiating, and, as we saw, a near halt to new lending or refinancing. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
the circumstances of a default when long-term debt is reclassified as a current liability (under accelerated repayment 
terms).  The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 also notes that technical default of debt contracts can be a 
basis for auditors disclosing going-concern problems.  More recently, in 2004, the SEC adopted a fourth rule 
(Release No. 33–8400), which requires a firm to file a Form 8–K report if a triggering event causing the increase or 
acceleration of a direct financial obligation of the firm occurs and the consequences of the event are material to the 
company.  One example of such an event is technical default on a credit agreement.  However, the effective date of 
this new disclosure rule occurs subsequent to our sample period. 
5 Item 303 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR §229.303: Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 




behavior modification would bias our sample in an unknowable way. But, as risk or perceived 
risk increases, the costs of technical default will also increase and that would bias our results 
towards our null hypothesis.  
For inclusion in our sample, we require not only that firms be in technical default but that 
they have disclosed accounting-based covenant(s), identified violation(s), and reported lenders’ 
responses to those violations. Table 1 presents the overall search results. The initial sample 
includes 334 observations of technical default violators. Because we expect differences in both 
incentives to manage earnings and the cost of technical default for first-time violations, we 
eliminate 45 observations that are not first-time covenant violators of the lending agreements. To 
eliminate the most financially distressed observations, we delete 27 firms in actual default of 
debt service payments or that subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in the two fiscal years 
after the technical default fiscal year.  We also eliminate 11 observations due to lack of 
COMPUSTAT financial information over our sample period. In addition, we are unable to find 
copies of the actual debt contract for 27 firms. Finally, as McNichols (2000) cautions that merger 
and acquisition activities can bias estimates in earnings management studies, we eliminate 3 
observations due to merger and acquisition activities. The resulting final sample includes 221 
observations.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Sweeney (1994) argues that managers may find technical default inevitable and delay 
making income-increasing accounting choices until the period of technical default in an attempt 
to lower post-technical default penalties by reporting higher earnings. She also suggests that 
managers may face unexpectedly high default costs that create a stronger incentive subsequent to 




covenant violation year (0 in event time), and both the year prior to covenant violation (-1 in 
event time) and two years prior to covenant violation (-2 in event time). 
b. Sample Statistics 
In our sample, all firms are aligned in event time relative to the fiscal year of the initial 
covenant violation of a lending agreement. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, firms in our sample 
report most frequently violating debt covenants for reasons related to minimum net worth, 
minimum working capital, minimum current ratio, and maximum debt-to-equity ratio. The 
descriptive statistics for our sample on the magnitudes of violated covenants are consistent with 
prior research (Beneish and Press (1993); Sweeney (1994); Jaggi and Lee (2002)). In our sample 
of 221 firms, we are able to document 335 violations of accounting-based debt covenants. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 2, slightly more than half of our sample firms (n = 114; 52%) have 
violated only one covenant while the remaining observations (n = 107; 48%) have violated two 
or more covenants.6 
 (Insert Table 2 here) 
c. Measuring Technical Default Cost 
To measure the expected costs of technical default, we use realized default costs reported 
when covenant violations are reported, which we obtain from the firm’s annual and quarterly 
reports. Consistent with Beneish and Press (1993), our sample evidence indicates the following 
most frequently reported new costs: reduced borrowing limits, measured as the percentage 
reduction in borrowable amount; increased restrictive covenants, measured as the percentage 
change in accounting, investing, and financing constraints; and higher interest rates, measured as 
                                                 
6 Dichev and Skinner (2002) examine a large sample of private debt agreements and measure firms’ closeness to 
current ratio and tangible net worth constraints. They find a significantly greater proportion of firms slightly above 
covenant violation thresholds than below, and they interpret the evidence to mean that managers take actions to 
avoid covenant default. Since Dichev and Skinner’s (2002) sample period (1986 to 1999) is reasonably similar to 
ours, we compare our descriptive statistics to theirs and find our results very similar to those reported in the 




the change in interest rate percentage. Our descriptive statistics on the magnitudes of violated 
covenants are also consistent with prior research (Beneish and Press (1993); Sweeney (1994); 
Jaggi and Lee (2002)). The most frequently cited reasons for violating debt covenants in our 
sample relate to minimum net worth, minimum working capital, minimum current ratio, and 
maximum debt-to-equity.7  
Smith (1993) argues that costs imposed subsequent to debt renegotiation are not 
homogeneous and vary across firms depending on their capital structures and investment 
opportunity sets. To address this concern, we calculate the cost of technical default using 
principal component analysis, which has the advantage of estimating cost by identifying the most 
important gradients, to develop a continuous construct variable specific to each observation. The 
factors generated are thought to be representative of the underlying processes that have created 
the correlations among the included variables (Greene, 2003).  In addition, we do not believe the 
hindsight bias generated by proxying expected cost with the actual results of technical default is 
systematic. Rather, we assume that because managers can, on average, accurately estimate the 
cost of technical default, our measure is a reliable proxy for managerial information prior to 
technical default.  
 Our principal component analysis combines the attributes found in prior research with the 
eight actual consequences of technical default found in our sample:  
(1) permanent waiver with no renegotiation; 
(2) permanent waiver after renegotiation with no additional restrictions; 
(3) permanent waiver after renegotiation with additional restrictions; 
(4) temporary waiver with no renegotiation; 
(5) temporary waiver after renegotiation with no additional restrictions; 
(6) temporary waiver after renegotiation with additional restrictions; 
(7) no waiver with no renegotiation and the lender not calling the loan; and 
(8) no waiver after renegotiation and the loan being called.  
 
                                                 
7 Because accounting-based covenants are of interest in our study, it is reasonable to include cash-flow constraint 




We identify the results using dichotomous variables.  
We also use the new costs associated with additional restrictions, identified in the text of 
annual and quarterly reports, to obtain a more precise measure of the actual cost of technical 
default. As outlined above, the most frequently reported new costs are reduced borrowing limits 
(RB: the percentage reduction in the available borrowable amount), additional restrictive 
covenants (AC: the percentage change in the financial covenants), and higher interest rates (IR: 
the percentage change in the interest rate). 
Asquith et al. (2004), and Beatty and Weber (2003) argue that the cost of technical 
default is lower when there is a single lender. In contrast, debt agreements with multiple lenders 
usually require a supermajority or unanimous consent to modify the contract or grant a waiver. 
Requiring at least a supermajority reduces the likelihood of either a modification of contract 
terms or a waiver as the number of lenders increases. We capture this cost increase using the 
number of lenders in the loan syndication for private debt (LND).   
d. Control Variables for Modeling Technical Default Cost 
Beneish et al. (2004) suggest that the cost of technical default is greater for high growth 
opportunity firms, therefore, we use Tobin’s Q (the market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by the book value of assets) to estimate a proxy for growth opportunities in our 
sample. This variable is measured two fiscal years prior to the fiscal year of debt covenant 
violation using financial statement data obtained at the beginning of that fiscal year. To proxy for 
the effect of covenant changes on growth, we interact this growth opportunities proxy with the 
effect of the reduced borrowing (RBG), additional covenants (ACG), and interest rate change 
(IRG) on the technical default cost.  
Following Beatty and Weber (2003), we include two other debt-related aspects of the 




the debt agreement, and the relative size of the debt in default. If time to maturity (TM) is 
shorter, lenders have less risk and are likely to impose lower costs. Conversely, as the size (SIZ) 
of the debt increases, the lender is more at risk and likely to impose higher costs. In addition, we 
include a variable that proxies for the probability of future default (PAY), which we obtain using 
Chesser’s (1974) model for estimating the probability that a firm will default on future debt 
service. If the probability of actual debt service default is high, the technical default cost will 
increase.8 Finally, we include a variable to indicate whether the debt is secured (SEC) which we 
posit lowers risk to the lender and should reduce the cost of technical default. 
e. Discretionary Accounting Choice: Accounting Method Changes 
Managers use discretion in accounting procedures through either early adoption of 
mandatory accounting changes or by switching from one acceptable accounting method to 
another (e.g., LIFO to FIFO). Nonetheless, changing accounting methods is a costly activity even 
when technical default is not a factor. Healy and Palepu (1990) interpret their findings to mean 
that, to avoid covenant-mandated dividend restrictions, managers cut dividends rather than 
changing accounting procedures, arguably a costly action in terms of its expected effect on stock 
price. This finding implies that the expected costs (benefits) of making accounting changes are 
higher (lower) for some firms than the cost of voluntarily cutting dividends.  
To increase earnings through accounting method changes, a firm must have the flexibility 
to make accounting choices and change accounting methods. We measure accounting method 
changes (identified using notes to financial statements and COMPUSTAT footnote codes that 
supplement database items) as the magnitude of income increases resulting from voluntary 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that many of these control variables can proxy for risk. We investigate the consequences of this 
ability by removing the variables that we believe proxy for risk and inserting the firm’s beta. The main results of our 




accounting changes or early adoption of mandatory accounting changes.9 As show in Table 3, we 
observe the following rates of accounting method changes in the two years prior to and in the 
fiscal year of technical default: two years prior, 35.8 percent; one year prior, 40.6 percent; and in 
the year of default, 23.6 percent.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
We also note that approximately 49 percent of our sample of first-time violators of debt 
covenants made decisions to change accounting methods that increased income. 47 sample firms 
using an accelerated depreciation method and 75 using the LIFO inventory method voluntarily 
changed to straight-line depreciation or FIFO inventory, respectively. These changes generally 
result in increased earnings. Interestingly, the most frequent accounting changes are extending 
FIFO or changing from LIFO to FIFO inventory, options that lead to higher earnings but a 
reduction in cash flow due to higher income taxes. Dyreng (2009) also finds that as firms 
approach covenant violation they engage in income-increasing earnings management, increasing 
their income tax liability by an amount equivalent to increasing the cost of debt financing by 
between 12.92 and 22.72 basis points. Such willingness to accept an actual reduction in cash 
flows to avoid technical default further emphasizes its costly nature.  
f. Discretionary Accounting Choice: Accounting Accruals 
A second form of accounting choice is the discretion allowed in accounting accruals. 
However, compared to accounting procedure changes, discretionary accruals are both less 
obvious and less restricted (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); Healy (1985)). Because the expected 
                                                 
9 Because the promulgation of new accounting standards frequently allows a transition period for early adoption, we 
make no distinction in our main tests between early adoption of an accounting standard and an accounting method 
change. However, in supplemental tests, we consider only one voluntary accounting choice decision by deleting 
early adoption of a new standard. Although not displayed in Table 3, only one new accounting standard affects our 
sample period: SFAS 133, issued in June 1998 to address derivatives and hedging activities, allowed early adoption 
between 1998 and 2000. In our sample, managerial decisions to adopt this accounting standard early result in 50 





costs and benefits of decisions to change accounting methods or use discretion in accounting 
accruals are likely to be both firm- and time-specific surrounding technical default, managers 
must assess whether they expect the benefits of either (both) method(s) to outweigh the costs. 
We measure the second form of discretionary accounting choice using discretionary 
accrual techniques previously documented in the literature as capable of identifying earnings 
management (Dechow et al. (1995)). Specifically, we obtain a discretionary accrual proxy 
(EMDA) for each firm-year estimate using a modified Jones (1991) discretionary accrual model. 
In this model, we define operating accruals (ACC) as the change in current noncash assets minus 
the change in current liabilities exclusive of the current portion of long-term debt, minus 
depreciation and amortization, and scaled by lagged total assets. With reference to the annual 
COMPUSTAT data, we define operating accruals (ACC) as follows:   
 ACC =  (ACT - CHE - LCT + DLC - DP)/lagged AT. 
As in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), we estimate the discretionary accrual model cross-
sectionally each year using all firm-year observations from available COMPUSTAT data in the 
same two-digit SIC code industry:10  
 ACCi,t =   β0 + β1ASSETSi,t-1 + β2 (ΔSALESi,t - ΔARi,t ) + β3 PPEi,t + i,t,  (1) 
   where: 
(ΔSALESi,t -ΔARi,t) = change in sales minus change in accounts receivable scaled by 
lagged total assets (ASSETSi,t-1)  
PPEi,t = net property, plant and equipment scaled by ASSETSi,t-1.  
 
The use of total assets as the deflator is intended to mitigate heteroskedasticity in residuals. 
g. Control Variables for Other Incentives to Manage Earnings 
                                                 
10 Our approach to estimating the modified Jones model differs from that used by Dechow et al. (1995), who first 
estimate the Jones model parameters for each firm in their sample during the estimation period and then apply those 
parameters to a modified sales change variable to estimate discretionary accruals during the event period. Such an 
approach is likely to generate a large estimated discretionary accrual when a firm experiences extreme growth in the 
test period rather than the estimation period. Rather, to obtain a modified Jones model of discretionary accruals, we 
follow prior studies that estimate the model cross-sectionally and then subtract the change in accounts receivable 





Other factors identified in prior literature as being associated with earnings management 
include political costs, bonus plans, thresholds other than technical default, tax considerations, 
and decreases in liquidity. Because most, or some form, of these variables are used either as 
control variables or variables of interest in Beatty and Weber (2003), we include them to reduce 
potential omitted correlated variable problems.  
Both Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Zimmerman (1983) discuss political costs, 
which, together with the associated additional scrutiny of the firm’s actions, increase the cost of 
earnings management. As a result, firms with higher political costs tend to manage earnings less. 
Thus, we proxy for political costs (PC) using the natural log of the book value of total assets.  
Managers also have incentives to manage earnings when their bonus plans (BP) are tied 
to earnings (Healy (1985); Holthausen et al. (1995)). Therefore, we expect a positive association 
between earnings management and the existence of a bonus plan as proxied by cash salary plus 
bonus (Lambert and Larker (1987); Sloan (1993)). 
Besides technical default, two other earnings management thresholds are identified in the 
literature: reporting a loss and reporting a decrease in earnings from the previous fiscal year 
(Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Degeorge et al. (1999)). We define both situations as losses 
(LS) represented by a dichotomous variable equal to one if the observation would have reported 
a loss without the effects of the two forms of income-increasing earnings management, and zero 
otherwise. We also expect incentives to avoid losses and decreased earnings (relative to the 
previous fiscal year) will be greater in those observations whose common equity trades on a 
major exchange (i.e., the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ, 
including the National Market System). Therefore, to take into account the greater incentives to 




major stock exchange (LSX) and by zero otherwise. We expect a positive association between 
the proxies for incentive to avoid and the two forms of earnings management.  
Management can also avoid higher taxes that decrease cash flows by managing earnings 
through tax loss carryforwards. Thus, we include a dichotomous variable (TAX) equal to one if 
an observation has tax loss carryforwards and makes accounting changes with tax effects. 
Because having tax loss carryforwards can make technical default less costly, we expect it to be 
positively associated with earnings management. 
Decreased liquidity produces an incentive for cash-increasing accounting changes, thus 
changes in accounting methods that result in higher cash flows may stem from a need for 
liquidity rather than avoidance of technical default. Therefore, following Sweeney (1994), we 
multiply the change in operating cash flows, normalized by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal period, by a dichotomous value equal to one if the accounting change has a positive cash 
flow effect. Because discretionary accruals tend to have little or no cash flow affect, this liquidity 
proxy (LQ) is included only in the accounting choice model.  
An additional incentive for managers to manipulate earnings upwards is a performance 
pricing provision in debt contracts, which, besides affecting technical default cost, can affect 
earnings management decisions. Specifically, improvements in a borrower’s financial 
performance lead to a lower interest rate and vice versa, a dynamic that suggests a positive 
association between earnings management and performance pricing in debt contracts. Thus, our 
model includes a dichotomous value (PER) equal to one (zero otherwise) if the debt contract 
contains a performance pricing provision.  
Extant findings on whether earnings are managed to avoid reducing dividends are 
inconclusive. Sweeney (1994), Beatty and Weber (2003), Daniel et al. (2008), and Li et al. 




et al. (1994) find no such evidence. Nonetheless, for completeness and to control for potentially 
omitted correlated variables, we include a dichotomous value (DIV) equal to one if the debt 
contract contains a dividend constraint and zero otherwise. 
To make discretionary accrual choices, just as for accounting method changes, managers 
must have flexibility. Therefore, we include two flexibility proxy variables as follows: 
 for accounting choice flexibility (FLXAC) - measured as the number of income-
increasing accounting procedures available for each observation at the beginning of 
the fiscal year, and 
 for discretionary accrual flexibility (FLXDA) – measured using the root mean squared 
error of the estimation of discretionary accruals (Barton, 2001).11  
 
We expect a positive association between the flexibility proxies and the use of both accounting 
method changes and discretionary accruals. 
Mohrman (1996) and Beatty et al. (2002) find that a significant number of debt contracts, 
mostly private, dictate the use of specific accounting methods in the assessment of compliance 
with debt covenants (the so-called frozen GAAP). However, Beatty et al. (2002) also find that 
managers are willing to absorb higher costs to retain accounting flexibility so that accounting 
method changes can be used to calculate the limits defined in the debt covenant (flexible GAAP).  
In addition, Ghosh and Moon (2010) find firms that rely heavily on debt financing might be 
willing to bear higher borrowing costs because the benefits of avoiding potential debt covenant 
violations exceed the higher borrowing costs.  
In our sample, approximately 59 percent of observations exclude either voluntary or 
mandatory accounting changes in computations determining compliance with debt contract 
provisions, while 32 percent exclude both voluntary and mandatory accounting changes by 
requiring use of the GAAP in effect on the start date of the debt contract (frozen GAAP). The 
dichotomous variable (INC) is equal to one if a firm’s debt contracts allow either voluntary or 
                                                 




mandatory accounting changes to be used in the computations determining compliance with debt 
contract provisions. As documented in Beatty and Weber (2003), firms pay for the ability to 
include accounting changes in their calculations for contract monitoring, therefore, we anticipate 
a positive association between INC and accounting changes. We also predict a negative 
association between INC and the discretionary accruals model. That is, firms able to use the 
results of an accounting change in their calculations will tend to rely more on accounting 
changes and less on discretionary accruals to increase earnings.  
IV. Research Design and Model Specifications 
We implement a system of three structural models, each a function of the other two plus 
exogenous variables:  
EMDA    =  EMAC + CST  + O1 
EMAC    =  EMDA + CST  + O2 
CST      = EMDA + EMAC + O3 
 
   where:  
EMDA = decisions to manage accounting accruals: for income-increasing discretion in 
accounting accruals (DA), we use the value of income-increasing discretionary 
accruals as evidenced by estimating the modified Jones (1991) model to obtain a 
discretionary accrual proxy, 
EMAC = decisions to manage accounting procedures: for income-increasing accounting 
choice (AC) decisions, we use the value of upward earnings changes resulting from 
changes in accounting methods (scaled by total assets measured at the beginning of 
the fiscal period), 
CST   = estimated cost of technical default, and 
Oi       = vector of included control variables.
12 
 
The default cost of the two earnings management models is likely to be endogenous, as is 
simultaneity between the two earnings management models, therefore, we first test the structural 
models for an endogeneity/simultaneity bias.  We use an omitted variables variant of the 
Hausman (1978) test and find evidence of potential endogeneity/simultaneity bias in each model. 
                                                 
12 In our sample, and as documented previously in this area of the literature, most covenant violations occur or are 
disclosed toward the end of the fiscal year.  Accordingly, the financial statement data are obtained from the end of 
the fiscal year in the year of technical default (i.e., t0), and at the end of fiscal years t-1 and t-2 for the two periods 




To control for such bias in the estimated coefficients of interest, we estimate the following 
system of three structural equations using a two-stage least squares procedure: 
EMDA = α0 + α1 Predicted-EMAC + α2 Predicted-CST + α3INC + α4PC + α5BP + α6LS+ 
α7LSX + α8TAX + α9DIV + α10FLXAC + α11PER + ξ         (2) 
 
EMAC = β0 + β1 Predicted-EMDA + β2 Predicted-CST + β3INC + β4PC + β5BP + β6LS + 
β7LSX + β8TAX + β9LQ + β10DIV + β11FLXDA+ β12PER + ω    (3) 
 
CST = Φ0 + Φ1 Predicted-EMDA + Φ2 Predicted-EMAC + Φ3GO + Φ4LND + Φ5IRG + Φ6 
ACG +Φ7RBG + Φ8PER + Φ9SIZ + Φ10PAY + Φ11SEC + Φ12TM + έ   (4) 
 
In the first stage, we estimate equations (2), (3), and (4) using single-equation estimations 
with only the vector of control variables. The fitted values from these regressions, which by 
construction are independent of their respective error terms, are used as instrumental variables in 
the second-stage regressions.13  
We then investigate our prediction that managers form expectations about technical 
default costs prior to periods of covenant violations and, weighing the costs and benefits of the 
two discretionary accounting decisions, have greater incentives to make income-increasing 
accounting choices as expected default costs increase. We also predict that the two forms of 
earnings management are not independent discretionary choices. 
V. Results 
a. Empirical Evidence 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the results of estimating the system of equations two fiscal years 
prior to technical default, one fiscal year prior to technical default, and in the fiscal year of 
technical default, respectively. This analysis provides several insights into managerial attempts 
to delay technical default and lower its costs through accounting choice and accrual discretion in 
periods prior to and coincident with technical default.  
                                                 




In periods surrounding technical default, the expected costs of technical default (CST) are 
reliably positive in both earnings management models. This suggests, as predicted, that the 
higher the cost, the more managers will use earnings management to increase net income. The 
predicted values of EMDA are reliably negative, indicating that the two forms of upward earnings 
management can be viewed as substitute accounting choices made by managers in response to 
expected default costs in periods surrounding covenant violations.  
As expected, the evidence suggests that managers’ expectations of the costs of technical 
default are positively associated with their decisions to use income-increasing accounting choice 
in periods prior to and inclusive of the technical default period. The latter is important in that 
evidence suggests managers continue to act opportunistically by using income-increasing 
accounting choices even though technical default has occurred. Our findings are also consistent 
with managers expecting the cost of technical default to be a function of the magnitude of 
deviation in the calculated variable determining compliance from the required levels in debt 
contracts. Managers appear to use increased accounting discretion to report higher earnings when 
faced with higher expected technical default cost.14 This can be seen in Tables 4 through 6 which 
consistently show that the higher cost of technical default is positively associated with a higher 
level of earnings management. 
In addition, the evidence reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6 indicates an important factor in 
the decision to change accounting methods is whether the company has the flexibility to make an 
accounting change that will increase earnings (FLXAC). Managers are also apparently influenced 
by their desire to retain dividend payment flexibility in that the dividend variable (DIV) is 
reliably positive.  
                                                 
14 Dichev and Skinner (2002) provide evidence that private lenders constrain their debt covenant levels more tightly 
than public lenders. This tightness leads to a higher incidence of technical default with lower cost. In our sample, 
each observation is a private loan, which biases the cost of technical default downwards, and in our tests favors the 




(Insert Tables 4, 5, and 6 here) 
Two other determinants warrant discussion. First, the incentives for managers to use 
either form of earnings management seem greater when the firm is listed on a major exchange 
(LSX). Second, we also find evidence associating bonus plans (BP) with decisions to use 
income-increasing earnings management in the two fiscal years prior to and coincident with the 
fiscal year of technical default. 
b. Technical Default Cost 
As reported in Tables 4 through 6, we also estimate a model for the cost of technical 
default, which we find to be negatively associated with both forms of earnings management 
activities. The evidence suggests that managers use earnings management decisions rationally to 
lower technical default costs. Particularly important for understanding managerial incentives to 
achieve a certain financial result using accounting discretion are the findings reported for the 
fiscal year of technical default (see Table 6). Even though technical default is unavoidable, 
managers employ both forms of earnings discretion and are rewarded with lower technical 
default costs. This strongly suggests lenders either do not understand the earnings management 
activity or the covenants are so tight that technical default is not a serious concern.  
c. Robustness Test 1: Exclusion of Early Adopters of Mandatory Accounting Method Changes 
For the main tests, we do not differentiate between the inclusion of voluntary and 
mandatory accounting method changes. However, it can be argued that these two forms of 
accounting choice have varying levels of rewards and costs to both managers and lenders. We 
test the robustness of our findings by eliminating the earnings effect of early adopters.15 The 
results of these robustness tests are similar to our main findings.  
                                                 
15  For example, if a firm has both voluntary (e.g., $2,000) and mandatory (e.g., $500) income-increasing effects, the 
earnings effect included in the test is only $2,000. Conversely, if a firm has no voluntary changes and $2,000 




Although it might be argued that less justification can be made testing the robustness of 
our main findings when accounting choice is allowed only for mandatory accounting changes, 
we nevertheless perform such a test. The outcomes are again no different than our main test 
results; however, the allowed inclusion variable (INC, which is now 1) is not reliably different 
from zero (p-value <.20). Thus, the evidence suggests that managerial decisions tend to make 
greater use of accounting method choices to increase income surrounding technical default when 
voluntary choices are allowed. On the other hand, this evidence cannot be reliably interpreted to 
mean that allowing mandatory accounting choices tends to result in early adoption of income-
increasing accounting choice decisions surrounding technical default. 
d. Robustness Test 2: Accounting Changes Allowable in the Debt Agreement 
The evidence thus far suggests that accounting method changes and discretionary 
accruals are two alternative mechanisms available to managers to both avoid covenant violations 
and reduce the resulting costs of technical default. However, the evidence on the simultaneity of 
decisions to use the two forms of earnings management is less likely to hold when accounting 
changes are excluded in computations determining compliance with debt contract provisions.  
To investigate this issue, we repeat the endogeneity tests on two subsamples. First, we 
delete observations whose debt contract does not allow the inclusion of either voluntary or 
mandatory accounting changes in computations determining debt contract compliance. This 
subsample allows for either (but not both) voluntary or mandatory changes in accounting 
procedures (i.e., flexible GAAP). The evidence again supports simultaneity between the two 
forms of earnings management activities. Second, we delete observations in which the debt 
contracts clearly disallow the consideration of accounting changes in the calculation of ratios 




date of the debt contract (i.e., frozen GAAP). Under this frozen GAAP constraint, the test of 
endogeneity between the two forms of earnings management activities is not supported.  
VI. Conclusion 
Our findings indicate that accounting choice matters when a borrower is either 
approaching or in technical default. Specifically, we find evidence that, in contrast to their 
behavior when accounting changes are perhaps unimportant for debt covenants that restrict 
dividend payments (Healy and Palepu, 1990), managers use both accounting choice and 
discretion in accounting accruals to lower the costs of technical default. Our results further 
suggest that managers have private information about the expected costs and consequences of 
technical default and that, both prior to default and in the period of default, they condition their 
decisions about accounting choice and accounting discretion on these expectations. A reasonable 
inference is that managers drawing upon these two forms of earnings management expect their 
decisions to directly influence the costs of technical default.  
Fields et al. (2001) express concern that accounting research often fails to control for 
endogeneity in research design. Our methodology specifically addresses this endogeneity 
problem in an accounting decision context in which multiple decisions are likely to influence 
managerial behavior. Moreover, our findings suggest that the decision to use either form of 
earnings management is not independent of the decision to use the other form and, perhaps as 
important, the two forms are both used to intervene in the financial reporting process 
surrounding periods of technical default on debt contracts.  
However, several caveats are worth noting. First, income-increasing earnings 
management, in either form, can be motivated by attempts to value maximize the firm by 
signaling the asymmetry of managerial information or attempting to lower transaction costs for 




default firms can be expected to exhibit relatively more financial distress than a sample of firms 
that has not violated covenants. Thus, our findings could also be explained by the managers of 
these default firms switching to the most efficient set of accounting choices given their financial 
condition.  
Overall, we contribute to the technical default cost variation literature by documenting 
that the level of cost of technical default is a direct determinant of whether managers make 
decisions to use income-increasing accounting choices and discretion in accounting accruals. 
Further, we document that the two forms of earnings management, in the case of technical 
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Sample Selection Processa 
 
Firm Type # of Firms 
Firms in technical default on an account-based covenant that identify 
the violation and its results 
334 
   Minus the following observations:  
Non-first time violators during the sample period 45 
Defaulted on debt services or filed bankruptcy 27 
Financial information not available 11 
Firms with material bank debt contracts not filed with SECb 27 
Firms with significant mergers and acquisitions 3 
   Firms in our sample 221 
 a To identify firms in technical default of debt contracts, we searched the LexisNexis, Dow Jones News Service, and 
Compact Disclosure databases, which disclose the annual reports of public companies for fiscal years 1994 to 2000. 
The text searched included the notes to accompanying financial statements and discussion by managers in SEC 
filings (e.g., the Management Discussion and Analysis).  Our online search also included Forms 10–K, 10–Q, and 8–
K and, when complete SEC filings could not be obtained from our data sources, registration statements or annual 
and quarterly reports. 
b Neither our online search of Forms 10-Q and 8-K nor that of all the registration statements resulted in any copy of 





Distribution of debt covenant violations for firms entering first-time technical default in 1994–
2000 a 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Technical Default by Covenant Type 
 
Covenant Type 
# of covenants 
violated 
% of covenants 
violated 
Net worth, tangible net worth 141 42.09% 
Working capital 59 17.61% 
Current ratio 52 15.52% 
Debt-equity ratio 39 11.64% 
Interest coverage 22 6.57% 
Dividends paid in excess of earnings restrictions 10 2.99% 
Cash flow from operation or cash flow to total debt 8 2.39% 
Minimum earnings level 4 1.19% 
Total 335 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Number of Covenants Violated 
 # of firms % of firms 
Firms that violated one covenant 114 52% 
Firms that violated two or more covenants 107 48% 
Total firms in violation 221 100% 
a To identify firms in technical default of debt contracts, we searched the LexisNexis, Dow Jones News Service, and 
Compact Disclosure databases, which disclose the annual reports of public companies for fiscal years 1994 to 2000. 
The text searched included the notes to accompanying financial statements and discussion by managers in SEC 
filings (e.g., the Management Discussion and Analysis).  Our online search also included Forms 10–K, 10–Q, and 8–
K and, when complete SEC filings could not be obtained from our data sources, registration statements or annual 





Descriptive statistics for earnings management decisions for 221 U.S. firms entering first-time 
technical default in 1994–2000 
 
Income-increasing accounting changes in the two years prior to and in the fiscal year of technical 
default (t0) 
 t-2 t-1 t0 Total Changes 
FIFO adopted or extended 26 31 18 75 
Depreciation methods 17 19 11 47 
Depreciable lives 21 23 13 57 
Pension assumptions 10 11 7 28 
Other 8 9 5 22 
Number of accounting changes 82 93 54 229    
Total firms    108 






Estimation results for the three structural models (controlled for endogeneity)a  
Fiscal year two years prior to technical defaultb 
 EMAC EMDA CST 
Intercept 0.156 (2.180)** 0.315 (3.558)*** -0.287 (-2.585)*** 
Predicted-EMAC     -0.183 (-2.333)*** -1.069 (-2.810)*** 
Predicted-EMDA -1.128 (-3.508)***    -2.345 (-2.277)*** 
Predicted-CST 0.648 (2.497)*** 0.276 (3.189)***     
INC 0.398 (2.372)*** -0.182 (-2.188)***     
PC -0.017 (-0.074) -0.044 (-1.269)*     
BP 0.144 (1.901)** 0.152 (1.918)**     
LS 0.167 (2.184)** 0.133 (2.088)**     
LSX 0.265 (2.591)*** 0.240 (2.496)***     
TAX 0.065 (1.815)** 0.036 (1.157)     
LQi -0.204 (-1.189)         
DIV 0.445 (2.332)*** 0.314 (2.255)***     
FLXi 0.504 (2.876)*** 0.334 (2.995)***     
PER 0.202 (2.226)*** 0.185 (2.355)*** -0.203 (-2.036)** 
GO         0.124 (1.982)** 
LND         -0.147 (-2.273)*** 
IRG         0.259 (2.783)*** 
ACG         0.196 (1.992)** 
RBG         0.378 (3.098)*** 
SIZ         0.194 (2.091)** 
PAY         0.276 (3.086)*** 
SEC         -0.162 (-1.081) 
TM         -0.064 (-1.187) 
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.310 0.411 
 
aEMAC : Model 1: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting accruals  
EMDA:  Model 2: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting procedures  
CST:    Model 3: Determinants of estimated cost of technical defaults  
b The table reports t-statistics for the estimated coefficients in parentheses. The sample consists of 192 of the 221 
observations of first time violators in technical default of debt covenants with evidence of loans two years before 
technical default. Variables, measured two fiscal years prior to technical default unless specifically noted, are 
defined below. 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using either a one or two-tailed test as 
appropriate. 
 
Variable Definitions for Tables 4, 5, and 6:  
EMi = Effect of earnings management. For income-increasing accounting choice (AC) decisions, we use the value of 
earnings changes when accounting method changes (scaled by beginning of the period total assets). For 
income-increasing discretion in accounting accruals, we use the value of income-increasing discretionary 




CSTi = Cost of technical default measured either as a construct variable or the probability of waiver. 
TD  = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the firm avoided technical default, zero otherwise. 
INC = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the debt contract allows the effects of accounting changes to 
be included in contract calculations, zero otherwise. 
PC  = Political cost measured as the natural log of the book value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year 
(COMPUSTAT data item 6). 
BP  = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if a bonus plan exists, zero otherwise. We use Forbes annual 
compensation survey and search available proxy statements filed with the SEC available in LexisNexis and 
EDGAR.  
LS  = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the firm would have reported a loss without earnings 
management, zero otherwise. The variable is measured using earnings (COMPUSTAT data item 172) for the 
fiscal year of interest after removing the income-increasing effects of earnings management. 
LSX = LS * 1 if the firm is listed on a major stock exchange (the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ, including National Market System). 
TAX = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the firm has net operating loss carry-forwards (COMPUSTAT 
data item 52) and makes accounting changes that have tax effects. 
LQ  = Changes in operating cash flows (first-differenced COMPUSTAT data item 308) normalized by total assets 
and multiplied by a dichotomous variable with a value of one if the accounting change has a positive cash 
flow effect. In fiscal years prior to data from statement of cash flows being available, we use the balance 
sheet (i.e.., indirect) method to estimate operating cash flows. 
PER = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the debt contract includes accounting-based performance-
pricing constraints obtained from DealScan or from managerial discussions in the data sources. 
DIV = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the debt contract includes accounting-based dividend 
constraints 
FLXi  = Either AC, the number of income-increasing accounting procedures available for each firm, or DA, the root 
mean squared error of the regression used to estimate discretionary accruals. 
LND = Number of lenders providing loans to the borrower, either the number of lenders in the loan syndication for 
private debt or the log of the number of bonds issued for public debt. 
GO  = Proxy for growth opportunities measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt 
(COMPUSTAT data items 199 and 25, respectively) divided by the book value of assets. The variable is 
measured two years prior to the fiscal year of violation. 
IRG = GO * the percentage change in interest rate following the renegotiation process. 
ACG  = GO * the percentage change in the number of new constraints following the renegotiation process. 
RBG = GO * the percentage reduction in the amount of available borrowing credit. 
SIZ  = Natural log of the total amount of debt in default. 
PAY = Probability of default in future debt payment from the model in Chesser (1974) 
SEC = Dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 if the debt is secure, zero otherwise. 






Estimation results for the three structural models (controlled for endogeneity)a  
Fiscal year one year prior to technical defaultb 
 EMAC EMDA CST 
Intercept 0.145 (2.019)** 
)** 
0.297 (3.357)*** -0.259 (-2.329)*** 
Predicted-EMAC     -0.179 (-2.287)*** -1.028 (-2.702)*** 
Predicted-EMDA -1.106 (-3.040)***     -0.292 (-2.277)** 
Predicted-CST 0.629 (2.425)*** 0.268 (3.096)***     
INC 0.379 (2.303)*** -0.176 (-2.124)**     
PC -0.016 (-0.072) -0.043 (-1.193)     
BP 0.142 (1.868)** 0.150 (1.892)**     
LS 0.159 (2.120)** 0.130 (2.024)**     
LSX 0.257 (2.516)*** 0.233 (2.414)***     
TAX 0.062 (1.762)** 0.035 (1.123)     
LQi -0.198 (-1.155)         
DIV 0.436 (2.264)*** 0.305 (2.189)***     
FLXi 0.499 (2.792)*** 0.324 (2.907)***     
PER 0.198 (2.162)** 0.180 (2.287)*** -0.201 (-2.016)** 
GO         0.204 (2.893)*** 
LND         -0.138 (-2.124)** 
IRG         0.244 (2.625)*** 
ACG         0.241 (2.921)*** 
RBG         0.367 (3.008)*** 
SIZ         0.187 (2.011)** 
PAY         0.271 (3.025)*** 
SEC         -0.161 (-1.583)* 
TM         -0.062 (-1.141) 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.290 0.381 
 
aEMAC : Model 1: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting accruals  
EMDA:  Model 2: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting procedures  
CST:    Model 3: Determinants of estimated cost of technical defaults  
b The table reports t-statistics for the estimated coefficients in parentheses. The sample consists of 209 of the 221 
observations of first-time violators in technical default of debt covenants with evidence of loans one year before 
technical default. Variable definitions are reported in Table 4. Variables are measured one fiscal year prior to 
technical default unless specifically noted. 
 







Estimation results for the three structural models (controlled for endogeneity)a  
Fiscal year of technical defaultb 
 EMAC EMDA CST 
Intercept 0.131 (1.827)** 0.272 (3.071)*** -0.240 (-2.159)** 
Predicted-EMAC   -0.1 59 (-2.031)** -0.921 (-2.420)*** 
Predicted-EMDA -0.962 (-2.991)***   -0.254 (-1.980)** 
Predicted-CST 0.543 (2.092)** 0.231 (2.671)***   
INC 0.327 (1.985)** -0.152 (-1.831)**   
PC -0.014 (-0.062) -0.037 (-1.026)   
BP 0.136 (1.817)** 0.143 (1.821)**   
LS 0.136 (1.527)* 0.111 (1.734)*   
LSX 0.225 (2.201)*** 
 
0.204 (2.112)**   
TAX 0.056 (1.602)* 0.032 (1.021)   
LQi -0.177 (-1.031)     
DIV 0.395 (2.051)** 0.276 (1.983)**   
FLXi 0.442 (2.471)*** 0.287 (2.573)***   
PER 0.201 (2.190)*** 0.182 (2.317)** -0.201 (-2.016)** 
GO     0.187 (2.654)*** 
LND     -0.125 (-1.931)* 
IRG     0.226 (2.431)*** 
ACG     0.215 (2.608)*** 
RBG     0.314 (2.571)*** 
SIZ     0.176 (1.897)** 
PAY     0.242 (2.701)*** 
SEC     -0.153 (-1.698)** 
TM     -0.054 (-1.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.274 0.351 
 
aEMAC : Model 1: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting accruals  
EMDA:  Model 2: Determinants of decisions to manage accounting procedures  
CST:    Model 3: Determinants of estimated cost of technical defaults  
b The table reports t-statistics for the estimated coefficients in parentheses. The sample consists of 221 observations 
of first time violators in technical default on debt covenants. Variable definitions are reported in Table 4. Variables 
are measured in the year of technical default unless specifically noted. 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using either a one or two-tailed test as 
appropriate. 
